中国人民大学何超教授在中国人民大学财政金融学院作了题为常委贷款工具和公开市场操的讲座，讲座的主要内容是：

　　我们研究了三种不同的货币政策执行方案的影响：包干税(LST)，站在借贷工具(SLF)，以及公开市场操作(OMO)，在一个统一的货币政策框架，其中代理商积极借入和借出和贸易的政府债券。我们发现，如果没有金融摩擦，预期的通货膨胀具有相同的边际效应，无论三个实施方案的这是由中央银行(CB)。但是，与单纯OMO，虽然积极的通货膨胀长时间是可能的，如果认证机构不断增加其购买债券，积极稳定状态的通货膨胀是不可行的。当借款人被金融摩擦的制约，还有债券价格流动性溢价和LST可以有关于通货膨胀和福利比SLF和奥妙的关系性质不同的预测，因为后两者对借款人和贷款人的不同影响。 OMO进一步不同于SLF，它不仅影响通胀和贷款市场，也改变了政府债券的私营机构可以进行投保风险的数额。

　　何超，中国人民大学汉青研究院助理教授，美国威斯康星大学经济学博士，研究方向为宏观经济学，search theory，货币政策等。论文曾发表于Review of Economic Dynamics。

　　原文：We examine the effects of three different monetary policy implementation schemes: lump sum taxes (LST), standing lending facility (SLF), and open market operations (OMO), in a unified monetary framework where agents actively borrow and lend and trade government bonds. We show that without financial frictions, anticipated inflation has the same marginal effect, no matter which of the three implementation scheme is used by the central bank (CB). However, with OMO alone, though extended periods of positive inflation is possible if the CB continually increases its bond purchases, positive steady state inflation is not feasible. When borrowers are constrained by financial frictions, there is a liquidity premium in bond prices and LST can have qualitatively different predictions regarding the relationship between inflation and welfare than SLF and OMO, because the latter two have differential effects on borrowers and lenders. OMO further differs from SLF in that it not only affects inflation and the loan market, but also changes the amount of government bonds that private agents can carry to insure against risks.