厦门大学管理学院邀请李宁忠老师作了一场题为“ Restrictions on Managers’ Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News(对经理人以外的就业机会，对好消息坏的不对称披露的限制)”的讲座，厦门大学管理学院现设有工商管理在职研究生一级学科博士学位授权点(含会计学、企业管理、技术经济与管理、旅游管理)，工商管理博士后流动站，6个教科类硕士学位授权点(会计学、企业管理、技术经济与管理、旅游管理、管理科学与工程、系统工程)，2个专业硕士学位授权点(MBA、EMBA)。在职研究生讲座的主要内容是：

　　本研究调查的自愿披露的企业管理人员的境外就业机会的限制的影响。在不可避免披露原则(IDD)通过在美国的州法院承认其企业从加入或在他们的解雇形成与竞争对手公司的经理总部设地方较大的限制。我们发现，相对于好消息，坏消息的不对称扣缴大于在承认IDD比的其他国家，而这种效应在更大的机构投资者持股，分析师以下内容，董事会独立性的企业弱。这些结果表明，管理人员的境外就业机会的限制，对公司信息披露行为有显著意想不到的效果。我们通过显示相对于好消息，坏消息的不对称扣缴较大的国家有竞业禁止协议，劳动合同，从加入或形成一个竞争的公司禁止员工更严格的执法进一步验证了这一结论。我们也记录了对信息披露的国际直拨电话及竞业禁止协议的影响是渐进对方。

　　原文：This study examines the effect of restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities on voluntary corporate disclosure. The recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by courts in the U.S. states in which the firms are headquartered place greater restrictions on the managers from joining or forming a rival company upon their dismissal. We show that asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states that recognize the IDD than in other states, and that this effect is weaker in firms with greater institutional ownership, analyst following, and board independence. These results suggest that restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities have a significant unintended effect on corporate disclosure behavior. We further validate this conclusion by showing that the asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states with stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements, employment contracts that prohibit employees from joining or forming a competing firm. We also document that the effects of the IDD and noncompetition agreements on disclosure are incremental to each other.