中国人民大学张雨潇：内部合谋与熊彼特式增长的代理成本

　　中国人民大学张雨潇在中国人民大学经济学院进行了一场题为内部合谋与熊彼特式增长的代理成本的讲座，讲座的主要内容是：

　　本文分析了公司的内部组织和成长的过程之间的联系。我们提出一个熊彼特式的增长模式，即垄断企业面临由于组织内部管理人员之间勾结的代理成本。这些培训费会影响投资的积极性和创新在经济中的利率。当串通是自我实施的，更高的增长和更富有创造性的破坏缩短又将在组织勾结剂的时间跨度，使内部勾结更加难以为继。我们分析增长和代理问题之间的这种双向的机制，并展示如何侧承包企业和经济的增长速度中的交易成本，同时获得。

　　原文：This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyze this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.