杨春雷：自愿离职作为进行外部合作的一种制裁？

　　台湾中央研究院研究院杨春雷博士在对外经济贸易大学作了一场题为“自愿离职作为进行外部合作的一种制裁?”的讲座，杨春雷博士毕业于德国Dortmund University，现任台湾中央研究院研究員。他的研究兴趣是微观，博弈理论和实验。他的研究成果发表在Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Experimental Economics等期刊上。此次讲座的主要内容是：

　　如何激发合作伙伴，实现长期合作时，双方有自由单方面终止的关系?在本文中，我们首先使用实验室实验来研究在自愿分开的重复囚徒困境博弈(VSRPD)合作怎么弄的。我们观察到的行为模式，与出针锋相对经常假设在文献中不一致(Eeckhout，2006; Fugiwara - 格雷夫和奥野-Fugiwara，2009年，罗布和阳，2010)。在我们的实验中，大多数球员宁愿留在他们背叛的合作伙伴，然后进行报复，在下列期间(S)。我们提出了一个所谓的亲合作命题的命题，也是作为一类新的平衡点的称为CD-随遇平衡来解释如何永恒的合作，可以与这些在实验室中观察到的行为特征来实现。使用根均方偏差测试表明，我们在VSRPD理论预先拟合数据比所有文献中所讨论的策略显著更好。

　　原文：How do partners elicit and achieve long-term cooperation when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the relationship? In this paper, we first employ a laboratory experiment to investigate how cooperation comes about in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with out-for-tat often assumed in the literature (Eeckhout, 2006; Fugiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fugiwara, 2009; Rob and Yang, 2010). In our experiment, most players prefer to stay with their defecting partners and then retaliate in the following period(s). We propose a proposition called Pro-Partnership Proposition as well as a new class of equilibria called CD-Indifferent Equilibrium to explain how eternal cooperation can be achieved with these behavioral traits observed in the lab. Tests using root-mean-squared deviations suggest that our advance in theory of VSRPD fit the data significantly better than all the strategies discussed in the literature.