长江商学院黄春燕：优化流动性政策

　　长江商学院黄春燕在中国人民大学作了一场题为“优化流动性政策”的讲座，中国人民大学“汉青经济与金融高级研究院”是中国人民大学顺应国际经济学科改革趋势，建立的新型研究与教育基地。它将在新体制下融会国际师资、借鉴国外研究与教学模式，实现“放眼国际、立足本土”的办学特色。在职课程培训班讲座的主要内容是：

　　本文提出的流动性需求和供给的简单模型。我们表明，竞争性市场力量未能导致流动性的有效供应，而效率低是目前无论是在事前市场设计和现货市场的参与。因此，政策干预是必要的无论是在最初的市场设计阶段，并在现货市场，当流动性不足出现。我们发现，不同的政策干预有不同的市场条件下不同效率的后果。例如，虽然补贴流动性提供事前(例如，指定做市商)一般是有效的，市场流动性可能太高特别是当流动性事件的概率是小的;现货干预措施，补贴销售商(例如，放宽资本金要求，补贴贷款修改)通常是减少违约成本高于补贴购房者(如，公共和私营部门伙伴关系，以收购不良资产)，尤其是补贴购房者在现场更有效市场可能会妨碍市场参与者的激励机制，以提供流动性的事前。

　　黄春燕博士现为长江商学院金融学教授。黄教授于2003年获得麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院(MIT Sloan School of Management)金融学博士学位，并曾任德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校(The University of Texas at Austin)金融学终身副教授，讲授EMBA及博士学位的课程。她在税收、资产流动性、均衡资产定价，及基金管理等领域具有丰富的学术研究经验。她曾在国际顶级期刊如Journal of Financial Economics、Journal of Finance、Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Public Economics等上发表多篇学术论文。

　　原文：This paper presents a simple model of liquidity demand and supply. We show that competitive market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, and that the inefficiency is present both in ex ante market design and in spot market participation. Therefore, policy intervention is needed both at the initial market design stage and in the spot market when liquidity shortage arises. We show that different policy interventions have different efficiency consequences under different market conditions. For example, while subsidizing liquidity providers ex ante (e.g., designated market makers) is generally efficient, the market liquidity might be too high especially when the probability of liquidity event is small; spot interventions that subsidize sellers (e.g., relaxing capital requirements, subsidizing loan modifications) is generally more effective at reducing the cost of default than subsidizing buyers (e.g., public-private partnership to purchase toxic assets), especially since subsidization to buyers in the spot market might hinder the incentives of market participants to provide liquidity ex ante.