浙江财经大学金融学院举行内源性借贷约束和财富的不平等讲座，此次讲座由王敏教授主讲，浙江财经大学金融学院举办的此次在职研究生讲座的主要内容是：

　　本文研究了贫富差距的一个经济体与内源性借贷约束的演变。在该模型中的经济，年轻的代理商需要贷款，以资助人力资本的投资，但不能承诺偿还贷款。债权人可以通过从信贷市场永久驱逐他们的惩罚拖欠。在均衡状态下，贷款违约防止被征收借款限额绑在借款人的遗产。在继承的异质性转化为异质性贷款限额：内源性，一些借款人面临零借款限额;有些是部分受限，而另一些则不受约束。根据遗产的初次分配，有可能所有的系都吸引要么零借贷限制稳态或无约束借款稳态 - 长期的平等。也可能有些谱系最终在一个稳定状态，其余的另 - 完整的两极分化。

　　王敏教授在浙江大学农业经济与管理系获管理学硕士学位，随后在爱荷华州立大学经济系获经济学博士。发表的论文主要有《中国的高房价是否阻碍了创业？》、《能源体制改革：有效的市场，有为的政府》、《限购和房产税对房价的影响：基于长期动态均衡的分析》等。

　　原文：This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. In equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in the borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit; some are partly constrained, while others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible all lineages are attracted to either the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state -- long-run equality. It is also possible some lineages end up at one steady state and the rest at the other -- complete polarization.